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Reply
Lochnering
Cass R. Sunstein*
Between 1905 and 1937, the legal culture experienced a genuine
revolution. In 1905, the Supreme Court invalidated a maximum hour law for
bakers,' concluding that the State of New York could not transform bakers
into "wards of the state.",2 In 1923, the Court struck down a minimum wage
law for women and children.3 The Court explained: "To the extent that the
sum fixed exceeds the fair value of the services rendered, it amounts to a
compulsory exaction from the employer for the support of a partially indigent
person, for whose condition there rests upon him no peculiar responsibility,
and therefore, in effect, arbitrarily shifts to his shoulders a burden which, if it
belongs to anybody, belongs to society as a whole. ' 4 In the Court's view, the
police power was sharply limited, and whatever it included, it did not include
the power to require minimum wages or maximum hours.5 Ideas of this sort
played an important role in cases striking down not only minimum wage and
maximum hour laws, but a number of other measures attempting to protect
workers.6
At the same time, a countermovement was occurring within the legal
culture.7 Between 1915 and 1935, many commentators urged that property
rights were a product of law, and that government regulation, in the form of
maximum hour or minimum wage laws, could not be seen as interference
with a voluntary or law-free private domain. In 1923, the Supreme Court
emphasized the importance of respecting "fair value." 8 But in 1918, Justice
Holmes had produced a responsive and relevant near-haiku: "Property, a
Karl N. Llewellyn Distinguished Service Professor of Jurisprudence,
Law School and
Department of Political Science, The University of Chicago.
1. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
2. Id. at 57.
3. Adkins v. Children's Hosp., 261 U.S. 525 (1923).
4. Id. at 557-58.
5. A qualification is Bunting v. Oregon, 243 U.S. 426 (1917), upholding a maximum hour law
for factory workers of both sexes.
6. See, e.g., Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161 (1908) (overturning a conviction for firing a
worker belonging to a union); Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. I (1915) (invalidating a law banning
contracts forbidding workers to join unions). I am not arguing that the invalidated measures were
desirable or that they actually protected workers in general or on balance. It is well known, for
example, that minimum wage legislation can increase unemployment.
7. For a superb and detailed treatment, see BARBARA FRIED, THE PROGRESSIVE ASSAULT ON
LAISSEZ FAIRE: ROBERT HALE AND THE FIRST LAW AND ECONOMICS MOVEMENT (1993).

8. Adkins, 261 U.S. at 557.
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creation of law, does not arise from value, although exchangeable-a matter
of fact." 9 In this highly compressed sentence, Holmes insisted that property
is not produced by value but instead by law-and that this is simply "a
matter of fact." By 1935, the attack on laissez-faire, and the insistence on the
omnipresence of government regulation, was well-known, to the point where
an unsigned student note, dealing with the law of contract, ridiculed the idea
that a refusal "to supervise the ethics of the market place" could be justified
by "doctrines of laissez-faire."'0 The student author thought the justification
implausible for one reason: "[T]he freedom from regulation postulated by
laissez-faire adherents is demonstrably non-existent and virtually
inconceivable.
Bargaining power exists only because of government
protection of the property rights bargained, and is properly subject to
government control."" 1
Columbia law professor Robert Hale set forth the most powerful
defense of this view, and his eyes were trained directly on Lochner and
related decisions.' 2 Hale wrote against the background of the political
struggle over government efforts to set minimum wages and to regulate
prices, a struggle that he believed was being waged on false premises. His
special target was the view that governmental restrictions on market prices
should be seen as illegitimate regulatory interference in the private sphere.
This, said Hale, was an exceedingly confused way to describe the problem.
Regulatory interference was already there:
The right of ownership in a manufacturing plant is ... a privilege to
operate the plant, plus a privilege not to operate it, plus a right to keep
others from operating it, plus a power to acquire all the rights of
ownership in the products ....

This power is a power to release a

pressure which the law of property exerts on the liberty of others. If
the pressure is great, the owner may be able to compel the others to
pay him a big price for their release; if the pressure is slight, he can
collect but a small income from his ownership. In either case, he is
paid for releasing a pressure exerted by the government-the law.
The law has delegated
to him a discretionary power over the rights and
3
duties of others.'
Did these ideas play any role in American political life? Consider
Franklin Delano Roosevelt's Commonwealth Club Address in 1932, where
he emphasized the view, which he attributed to Thomas Jefferson, "that the
9. Int'l News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 246 (1918) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
10. Note, The Peppercorn Theory of Consideration and the Doctrine of Fair Exchange in
ContractLaw, 35 COLUM. L. REv. 1090, 1091 (1935).
11. Id.at 1091-92.
12. See FRIED, supra note 7, at 8 (remarking that Hale's analyses of property rights, coercion,
and the role of legal entitlements in structuring economic life are the "best treatments of the subject

to date").
13. Robert Hale, Rate Making and the Revision of the Property Concept, 22 COLUM. L. REv.
209, 214 (1922).
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exercise of the property rights might so interfere with the rights of the
individual that the Government, without whose assistance the property rights
could not exist, must intervene, not to destroy individualism, but to protect
' ' 14
it.
In first accepting the Democratic nomination, Roosevelt made a similar
point. He complained that some leaders refer to "economic laws-sacred,
inviolable, unchangeable"; to this he responded that "we must lay hold of the
fact that economic laws are not made by nature. They are made by human
beings."' 15 Consider as well Roosevelt's emphasis6 on "this man-made world
of ours" in advocating social security legislation.'
Did these views play any role in the Supreme Court? In dealing its
1937 death-blow to the Lochner era, the Court wrote,
The exploitation of a class of workers who are in an unequal
position with respect to bargaining power and are thus relatively
defenseless against the denial of a living wage ... casts a direct
burden for their support upon the community. What these
workers lose in wages the taxpayers are called hpon to pay. The
bare cost of living must be met. We may take judicial notice of
the unparalleled demands for relief which arose during the recent
period of depression and still continue to an alarming extent
despite the degree of economic recovery which has been
achieved .... The community is not bound to provide what is in
effect a subsidy for unconscionable employers. 17
Or consider the Court's decision just one year later in Erie Railroad
Company v. Tompkins,' 8 recognizing that the common law should be seen,
not as a set of timeless or natural truths, but as the emanation of the will of
some sovereign. In many ways, the attack on the system of laissez-faire, and
the claim that the common law was a humanly constructed social order, came
to prominence in the late 1930s.
Lochner's Legacy' 9 was a mildly revised version of a public lecture. 2° It
offered a seven-page discussion of Lochner and its demise, about half of
which was devoted to the Lochner decision itself. The goal of the lecture
was to suggest that Lochnering could be seen, not merely in "judicial

14. Franklin D. Roosevelt, Campaign Address on Progressive Government at the
Commonwealth Club (Sept. 23, 1932), in I THE PUBLIC PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF FRANKLIN D.
ROOSEVELT 742, 746 (Samuel 1. Rosenman ed., 1938) (emphasis added) [hereinafter PUBLIC
PAPERS].

15. Franklin D. Roosevelt, The Governor Accepts the Nomination for the Presidency (July 2,
1932), in 1 PUBLIC PAPERS, supra note 14, at 657.
16 Franklin D. Roosevelt, Message to the Congress Reviewing the Broad Objectives and
Accomplishments of the Administration (June 8, 1934), in 3 PUBLIC PAPERS, supra note 14, at 288.
See also Morris R. Cohen, Property and Sovereignty, 13 CORNELL L.Q. 8 (1927), which makes
similar points.
17. West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 399 (1937).
18. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
19. Cass R. Sunstein, Lochner's Legacy, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 873 (1987).
20. See id. at n.*.
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activism," but in all decisions taking the status quo, or the common law, as
the baseline for deciding whether government had engaged in some
constitutionally troublesome intervention into existing affairs. Following the
1935 student commentator, I urged that a "failure to impose a minimum
wage is not nonintervention at all but simply another form of action-a
decision to rely on traditional market mechanisms, within the common law
framework, as the basis for regulation.'
I claimed that Lochnering, understood in this way, could be found in many places, including the constitutional
assaults on campaign finance law and affirmative action, as well as certain
uses of the state action doctrine, and certain understandings of sex
discrimination. 22 I also claimed that we should not "Lochner preferences"that is, we should not see existing preferences as if they spring from the sky
and never have anything to do with legal arrangements.23
To say the least, Lochner's Legacy was not a work of legal history. I
attempted to stay true to the period-hence, among other things, the heavily
qualified nature of the seven-page discussion 2 4 but in a way that could not
come close to doing real justice to it. In these circumstances, David
Bernstein's article is an extremely valuable addition.2 5 Bernstein examines
the Court's performance with far more care than I did; he greatly illuminates
the era, and he offers reasons to question my basic claims. I am grateful to
Bernstein not only because he adds so much to our understanding of the
period, but also because of the generosity, care, and scrupulousness with
which he states, and rejects, the argument of Lochner's Legacy.
Most of Bernstein's own claims seem to me convincing. He is right to
say that the Supreme Court allowed state governments to alter the rules of the
common law, perhaps above all in Holden v. Hardy,26 upholding a maximum
hour law for miners, but also in cases abolishing the contributory negligence
defense and the fellow servant rule.2 7 He is correct to observe that the
Lochner Court allowed governments to go well beyond the system of laissezfaire.28 Again Holden v. Hardy is an example, but in other cases the Court
allowed states to protect women and children and to reduce workplace
injuries, among other things. 29 Bernstein emphasizes, reasonably, that the
21. Id. at 880-81.
22. Id. at 883-900.
23. Id. at 900-02.
24. See, e.g., id. at 878 n.27 (emphasizing that redistributive taxation was permitted); id. at 879
n.30 (emphasizing that changes in the common law were permitted); id. (emphasizing that a
commitment to the common law was coextensive with a widely held normative theory about the
proper role of government); id. at 880 n.40 (emphasizing the complexity of the framework
governing the legitimate uses of the police power).
25. David E. Bernstein, Lochner's Legacy's Legacy, 82 TEXAS L. REV. 1 (2003).
26. 169 U.S. 366 (1898).
27. Bernstein, supra note 25, at 23-24.
28. Id.
29. Id.
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Court protected civil liberties in cases that did not involve economic liberties
at all, creating the origins of the modem right to privacy. 30 He also objects to
my reading of the Lochner opinion, and urges that in West Coast Hotel, the
Court did not, in fact, emphasize that the common law is a regulatory
system-one that also embeds government action. To Bernstein, West Coast
Hotel was very far from a recognition of Hale's views, or Roosevelt's.
In all of these ways, Bernstein adds to existing learning about the
Lochner period. But his picture seems to me incomplete, above all because it
does not adequately specify the Court's understanding of the police power. I
believe that there is a close connection between that understanding and the
Court's use of common law baselines to question legislation. Compare two
claims:
1. The Lochner Court treated the common law as sacrosanct; it did
not allow legislaturesto departfrom it.
2. Insofar as the Lochner Court invalidated legislation under the Due
Process Clause, it usually did so because it saw the Constitutionas
forbiddingdeparturesfrom the common law unless those departures
could be justified as falling under certain specific "heads" of the
police power.
To the extent that Bernstein rejects claim (1), he is on firm ground. But
I believe that claim (2) is correct, and that it helps to explain what
Lochnering was, and is, all about. Here Lochner itself is the strongest
evidence. The heart of the opinion is a lengthy discussion of how the
maximum hour law cannot be justified as a "labor law" or a "health law. 3 1
In the Court's view, it cannot be justified as a labor law because bakers have
full legal capacity. 32 By itself, this is an extraordinary and even amazing
holding, one with large implications, because it forbids government from
using the idea of "labor law" to attempt to protect a wide range of workers
from adverse outcomes in the labor market. 33 The Court also held that the
maximum hour law could not be defended as a "health law," because it could
not be shown that bakers' health was peculiarly vulnerable from long hours
of work.34 As the Court itself stressed, this ruling also had significant
implications, forbidding maximum-hour legislation in innumerable domains.

30. Id. at 44-47.
31. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 57-64 (1905).
32. Id.at 57.
33. Bernstein offers useful and important qualifications. See Bernstein, supra note 25, at 47-

53.
34. Lochner, 198 U.S. at 57-59.
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Bernstein insists that we should not overread the Court's suspicion "that
there was some other motive dominating the legislature than the purpose to
subserve the public health or welfare." 35 Let us grant him the point. The
larger claim remains. In Lochner, the Court held that the police power did
not permit the state to invoke paternalistic or redistributive goals to engage in
legislation of the kind that is now believed to be legitimate in democracies all
over the world. And when the Adkins Court complained of a "compulsory
exaction," I believe that it was specifying the foundation for the Court's view
of what made those uses of the police power off-limits. In my view, the key
to many of the invalidations in the Lochner period-and the invalidations are
what remain of interest-lies in the relationship between the limited
understanding of the police power and the notion of what employers
"owned" or "had" as a matter of constitutional right.
West Coast Hotel raises many complexities, and Bernstein is right to say
that the Court did not produce the opinion that would have been written by
Robert Hale or Franklin Delano Roosevelt (though in the latter case it came
fairly close). The Court's opinion has many strands. But the Court did
emphasize the situation of workers "who are in an unequal position with
respect to bargaining power and are thus relatively defenceless against the
denial of a living wage." 36 The Court did contend that it was perfectly
legitimate to require "the payment of a minimum wage fairly fixed in order
to meet the very necessities of existence. 3 7 The Court did insist that the
"community is not bound to provide what is in effect a subsidy for
unconscionable employers. 3 8 Is it entirely coincidental that just one year
later, the Court, quoting Justice Holmes, rejected the idea that there is "a
transcendental body of law outside of any particular State" 39-and thus
insisted that federal courts must follow state common law, rather than
jettisoning it in favor of their version of "federal general common law"? 40 If

we see West Coast Hotel as symbolizing the end of an era, we would do well
to place it in a particular context, one in which anonymous student writers
could contend that "the freedom from regulation postulated by laissez-faire
adherents is demonstrably non-existent and virtually inconceivable, ' '4 1 and in
which the nation's leader could insist "that the exercise of the property rights
might so interfere with the rights of the individual that the Government,

35. Id. at 63. An interesting puzzle remains, however: What did the Court mean by this
statement?
36. West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parish, 300 U.S. 379, 399 (1937).
37. Id.
38. Id. By drawing attention to these remarks, I am not arguing in favor of minimum-wage
legislation or suggesting that such legislation is the best way of helping low-wage workers.
39. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 79 (1938) (quoting Black & White Taxicab Co. v.
Brown & Yellow Taxicab Co., 276 U.S. 518, 533 (1927)) (Holmes, J., dissenting)).
40. Id. at 78.
41. Note, supra note 10, at 1091-92.
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without whose assistance the property rights could
not exist, must intervene,
42
not to destroy individualism, but to protect it."
Bernstein is certainly correct to say that the Lochner Court did not wield
the idea of the night-watchman state as a kind of all-purpose check on
government action. Holmes overstated; the Lochner Court did not try to
enact Mr. Herbert Spencer's Social Statics. But I am not sure what Bernstein
thinks was wrong with the Lochner decision, or even what he thinks the era
was all about. When all the dust settles, I continue to believe that it will not
be possible to understand Lochner without close attention to the
simultaneous attack on the common law and laissez-faire-an attack that
found its way into the White House itself.43 Lochnering is not just one thing.
But Lochner's legacy can be found in the many domains in which people
continue to neglect the large presence of government, and law, in areas that
are in fact pervaded by them.

42. Roosevelt, supra note 14, at 746.
43. I discuss some of this in more detail in CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE SECOND BILL OF RIGHTS
(forthcoming Basic Books 2004).
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